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CHAPTER 2 
The Pharmaceutical Industry and the World 
Trade Organisation's TRIPs Agreement: 
Intellectual Property, Global Governance and Health 
Gerard Downes 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry in 
the United States accomplished a spectacular victory in policy-making 
that will have profound consequences for public health policy on a global 
scale. Although the industry was heavily criticised domestically during the 
1980s for maintaining inflated prices on prescription drugs, a coterie of 
pharmaceutical firms successfully campaigned throughout the decade for 
the US government to adopt the industry's international objectives in the 
area of intellectual property rights. 1 Their campaign culminated in the 
signing of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPs) by contracting parties to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 in Marrakech, Morocco, on 15 April 1994. 
The globalisation of intellectual property rights, as embodied in TRIPs, 
was the most significant change in intellectual property laws enacted in the 
twentieth century. 
This chapter examines why countries ceded sovereignty over an issue 
as fundamental as the intellectual property laws which determine who 
gains control of information and technologies. It also assesses the 
implications of TRIPs for World Trade Organisation (WTO) member 
states in the area of public health policy. 
Intellectual property and TRIPs 
TRIPs is one of the three pillars of the WTO and was negotiated during 
the Uruguay Round of trade talks that took place from 1986 to 1994 
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under the auspices of the GATT. TRIPs came into being with the 
establishment of the WTO on 1 January 1995. Under TRIPs all WTO 
members3 must introduce legislation that complies with the provisions of 
the agreement. For many WTO members, the TRIPs agreement has 
ushered in a period of profound change as a large number of countries 
have amended their existing legislation or drafted completely new laws 
pertaining to intellectual property rights. 4 
Intellectual property rights are the rights given to persons over 
creations of the mind such as inventions, works of art and literature and 
designs. Intellectual property rights, such as patents, trade marks and 
copyright, grant the creators of an object an exclusive right over the use 
of their creation for a certain period of time, usually twenty years. In order 
for a patent to be granted, the invention must fulfil the criteria of being 
novel, innovative and useful. 5 
TRIPs was framed with the intention of protecting intellectual 
property on a global scale by making the practice of intellectual property 
piracy punishable by a penalty such as economic or trade sanctions in the 
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a body which 
effectively acts as the WTO's court of arbitration. In July 2007, the WTO 
consisted of 151 members. If a member state perceives that a fellow WTO 
member is transgressing its intellectual property rights, the aggrieved party 
may bring a case to the DSU and seek redress therein. The DSU is a 
particularly significant development in global governance, as it gives the 
WTO enforcement powers that its predecessor institution, the GATT, 
inherently lacked.6 Under TRIPs, all members must provide a minimum 
of twenty-year patents on pharmaceutical processes and products. The 
holder of the patent has exclusive rights to manufacture, sell and distribute 
the drug during that time-span. At the time of the WTO's inception, the 
organisation had ninety-eight 'developing' country members. Twenty-five 
of those countries did not provide any patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products. Among those developing country members that 
had such laws in place, the length of patent protection in fifty-six of them 
was much shorter than twenty years.7 
Why the necessity for TRIPs? 
Rapid changes in technology and transformations in the structure of 
global capitalism in the 1980s helped to propel the issue of intellectual 
property rights from what was 'an arcane area oflegal analysis and a policy 
backwater' to the forefront of global economic policymaking.8 
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International trade in goods embodying intellectual property increased 
substantially with the rapid expansion of knowledge-based industries from 
the early 1980s onwards. As the USA's comparative advantage began to 
shift away from industrial manufacturing to high-technology industries 
such as pharmaceuticals, the protection of intellectual property became a 
fundamental tenet of the United States' economic foreign policy.9 
Concomitant to profound technological change was the perception 
among business leaders in many industrialised countries that inadequate 
protection of intellectual property (IP) in technology-importing countries 
was detrimental to their competitiveness. 10 This was an argument that 
found much resonance in the US Congress throughout the 1980s. Despite 
the fact that trade in counterfeit goods had been ongoing for centuries, the 
ease with which intellectual property-embodied goods, such as software 
and pharmaceutical products, could be replicated led to a call for a global 
IP protection regime." 
Barry MacTaggart, the then chairman and president of Pfizer 
International, first articulated the pharmaceutical industry's frustration 
with intellectual property piracy with an opinion piece in The New York 
Times in July 1982. In an article entitled 'Stealing from the Mind', 
MacTaggart accused a plethora of foreign governments of stealing 
knowledge and inventions that had been generated in the USA. 12 
MacTaggart asserted that, as more and more countries strive to 
industrialise, it is ironic that little or no respect is accorded the laws and 
principles that helped to bring about industrialisation, particularly in the 
area of patent protection, for high technology. 13 The Pfizer chairman 
neglected to relate how the piracy of intellectual property had been 
pivotal to the industrial development of countries as diverse as the 
United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 'Tiger' economies of 
south-east Asia. 14 
The ire of Pfizer and other major pharmaceutical firms was primarily 
focused on the Indian Patents Act of 1970, which exempted 
pharmaceutical products from patenting and provided for compulsory 
licensing, a strategy which allows a government to issue a licence to a 
domestic manufacturer to manufacture a drug without the consent of the 
patent holder. 15 Protection of its intellectual property interests is central 
to the international economic strategy of the United States, as goods 
embodying IP have been calculated to comprise almost half of its annual 
exports. However, intellectual property 'piracy' remains an all-pervasive 
problem. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) 16 
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calculated in 1993 that the US economy loses about $US200 billion each 
year and 750,000 jobs annually from piracy. 17 An earlier study into US 
losses from intellectual property piracy played a seminal role in fomenting 
political support for what later became the TRIPs agreement. 
In 1987, President Reagan commissioned the United States 
International Trade Commission (ITC) 18 to undertake a study with the 
aim of quantifying losses to the US economy from intellectual property 
piracy. Questionnaires were dispatched to affected industries. Firms with 
an interest in a trade-based approach to intellectual property rights had, 
according to Susan Sell, 'plenty of incentive to overestimate the losses 
knowing that the lTC report would be used by politicians and economists 
in Washington when they debated whether or not IP should become a 
major issue in international trade negotiations' .19 The lTC study found 
that the cost of all intellectual property violations to US industry was 
between $US43 and $US61 billion per annum. This figure included not 
only the cost of generic drugs to US pharmaceutical firms, but also 
copyright violations and trademark infringements.20 The findings of the 
study were particularly crucial because they galvanised the attitudes of 
policy-makers on Capitol Hill who hitherto had been either ambivalent or 
ignorant in their attitude to intellectual property. The survey acted as a 
catalyst to precipitate changes in intellectual property law within both the 
domestic and global spheres. 
The pharmaceutical industry was foremost among those high-tech 
information-based producers that called for changes in intellectual 
property rules. The lTC study stated that the cost of piracy to ten major 
US drug manufacturers was almost $US2 billion per annum. The Merck 
Corporation estimated the annual losses to the US pharmaceutical 
. industry overall at $US6 billion.2 1 Global piracy of pharmaceutical 
products was estimated to reduce annual R&D investment by US firms by 
between $US720 million and $US900 million a year. 22 
Bringing new drugs to market requires vast research and development 
resources. Imitating these products once they are in the marketplace by a 
process of reverse engineering is eminently easy. Reverse engineering is the 
process of taking a product apart in order to analyse its workings and then 
constructing a new product based on that knowledge. According to a 
much-cited 1991 study, a pharmaceutical product that can cost on average 
$US231 million to bring to market can be copied for virtually nothing. 23 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)24 
claimed in 1999 that it costs at least half a billion US dollars to bring a 
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new chemical entity to market. 25 A study conducted by Arnold Reiman 
and Marcia Angell, 26 however, is sceptical of PhRMA's claim. The authors 
contend that: 
The average out-of pocket, after-tax R&D cost of most of the drugs upon 
which the [pharmaceutical) industry's revenue now depends was probably 
much lower than $266 million (in year 2000 dollars). Tax credits for 
certain types of R&D would probably reduce that estimate even more. 27 
PhRMA's view was that only a stringent legal agreement such as TRIPs 
would obviate rampant intellectual property piracy and allow its members 
to plough back profits into R&D. In return for intellectual property 
protection, the pharmaceutical industry would bring investment and 
technology transfer to developing countries.28 PhRMA is one of the 
world's most politically influential and well-financed industrial lobbies. 
The organisation employs 297 full-time lobbyists on Capitol Hill - one 
for every two congressional representatives.29 One of the primary sources 
of PhRMA's power is its influence over the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), which has consistently backed PhRMA's 
claims with the threat of trade sanctions.30 
Throughout the 1980s, the veracity of the claim that intellectual 
piracy was undermining profits and R&D sat uneasily with the 
pharmaceutical industry's phenomenal performance. The dominance 
by pharmaceutical corporations of the Fortune 500 was reflected in the 
fact that Pfizer's return on investment was almost double the median 
return for Fortune 500 companies, while the group's net income rose 
from $US103.4 million in 1972 to $US800 million by 1990.31 
Nevertheless, policy-makers in Washington were loath to contradict the 
industry's claims. 
In response to the aforementioned lTC study, the US Congress passed 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act in 1988. This act contained 
'Special301' legislation requiring trading partners of the United States to 
extend intellectual property protection to US companies. Failure to 
comply with the Act would render countries subject to tariff retaliation for 
'unreasonable' practices.32 However, the country-by-country approach 
inherent in 'Special301' actions was highly inefficient. Firstly, there were 
too many countries with lucrative pharmaceutical markets to approach 
individually.33 Bringing a 'Special301' action against each recalcitrant state 
would therefore prove unwieldy. Also, trying to impose economic or trade 
sanctions on powerful economies such as China for infringements of US 
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intellectual property was especially problematic in the face of trenchant 
opposition to such sanctions from the US automobile and other exporting 
industries.34 If pharmaceutical companies' intellectual property rights were 
going to be protected on a global basis, 'some kind of comprehensive 
agreement would be necessary'. 35 TRIPs fulfilled all the criteria of such a 
comprehensive agreement. 
Creating new norms in intellectual property 
PhRMA saw the globalisation of US intellectual property protection 
standards as the requisite panacea to intellectual property piracy.36 In order 
for its argument to sway policy-makers in the US Congress, PhRMA had 
to formulate a new normative framework on intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). One of the strategies undertaken in constructing new norms in the 
area of IPRs was to link the perceived decline in US competitiveness 
throughout the 1980s with weakly enforced intellectual property rights 
in developing countries, and especially in the 'dragon economies' of east 
and south-east Asia.37 
The expansion of these Asian economies, and that of Japan in 
particular, during the 1980s began to erode the industrial foundations of 
the United States and was seen as a portent of US decline.38 Public myths 
were constructed in the US about the provenance of]apan's phenomenal 
growth. According to one commentator, 'American ideas, American 
know-how were being stolen by the Japanese, it was widely believed. The 
trade surplus that Japan had with the US became a rallying cry for 
protectionist elements within the United States.'39 When representatives 
of US intellectual property interests arrived on Capitol Hill in the mid-
1980s to relate their grievances, they not only encountered bipartisan 
congressional sympathy, but also a hardened resolve among policy-
makers to stymie America's economic decline by placing the issue of 
intellectual property rights within a multilateral body with a powerful 
enforcement mechanism. 40 
Placing intangible intellectual property rights, a concept synonymous 
with monopoly privileges, within an organisation committed to trade 
liberalisation, such as the WTO, would require turning this maxim on its 
head and instead equating the protection of intellectual property with the 
precepts of the free market. As Edwin J. Prindle of the US Patent Office 
stated, 'patents represent the best and most effective means of controlling 
competition. They occasionally give absolute command of the market, 
enabling their owners to name the price without regard to the cost of 
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production.'4' Edmund Pratt of Pfizer continuously stressed that it was 
necessary to demonstrate to governments abroad that protecting foreign 
intellectual property was in their enlightened self-interest. The framework 
successfully promoted by the pharmaceutical industry, that patent 
protection would lead to greater free trade, economic growth, investment 
and technology transfer to developing countries, became 'the normative 
building block of the TRIPs Agreement'.42 The fundamental reason for 
embracing intellectual property rights, according to Pratt, was not simply 
to comply with GATT or WTO rules or avoid trade sanctions, 'but to 
provide a base for the extension of liberal democratic principles that can 
lift economies and better lives' .43 
The formation of two business groupings, the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) in 1984 and the Intellectual Property 
Committee (IPC) in 1986, was critical in ensuring that the outcome of 
the Uruguay Round of trade talks was satisfactory to corporate interests. 
The I PC, which consisted of thirteen large US corporations such as Pfizer, 
Merck, Johnson & Johnson, Bristol-Myers and Dupont, set about 
establishing a global private sector/government network that would lay the 
ground for what became TRIPs.44 The IPC's primary achievement was 
convincing US government officials to take a tough stance on intellectual 
property issues in trade negotiations. This led to the issue of trade-related 
intellectual property rights being included on the GATT agenda when 
negotiations began in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986.45 
In order to secure a deal on intellectual property in the Uruguay 
Round, negotiators from the US, European Community and Japan had 
to make certain trade-offs, but even these reflected the great asymmetries 
of power in the global political economy. Conditions that exist in order 
for democratic bargaining to take place, namely full representation, full 
information and non-coercion, were excluded from the TRIPs 
negotiations and resistance within the GATT to the agreement 
becoming part of the new WTO was eradicated.'6 The so-called 'Green 
Room' procedure was often invoked during TRIPs deliberations, 
whereby the GATT director-general consulted in confidential 
surroundings primarily with the major trading powers of the 'Quad', 
namely the USA, Canada, Japan and the European Community. The 
findings of this group were then presented to the more formal GATT 
meetings, effectively as a fait accompli. 47 
While the TRIPs deliberations were taking place, PhRMA lobbied 
policy-makers in Washington to ensure that the North American Free 
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the USA, Canada and Mexico 
contained stringent intellectual property provisions. Mike Privatera, 
public affairs director of Pfizer Inc., stated at the conclusion of the 
talks: 'The Mexicans gave us everything we wanted.'48 The TRIPs 
agreement represented a failure of democratic processes, both 
nationally and internationally, as a tiny clique of knowledge-based 
companies was able to capture the US trade agenda-setting process and 
draft intellectual property principles that were to become the template 
for TRIPs.'9 Curiously, as Susan Sell writes, 'despite the fact that the 
TRIPs deliberations focussed on policies that affect virtually everyone 
on the planet, the GATT Secretariat received no complaints from 
consumer groups at the time of the negotiations' .50 The TRIPs 
agreement came into being on 1 January 1995 with a virtual whimper. 
Reaction to the agreement only began after its implementation, when 
the profound implications of TRIPs for public health were assessed. 
TRIPs moved from being purely a 'trade-related' issue to one of access 
to life-saving medicines. 51 
Implications of TRIPs 
Price is not the only determinant of access to essential medicines. Other 
vital factors which need to be addressed by policy-makers include 
providing a well-functioning and efficient healthcare infrastructure, 
comprehensive reach, adequate medical supplies and the presence of 
well-trained medical personnel.52 Nevertheless, price remains a primary 
component in determining whether people live or die. For this reason, 
the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association (IDMA) predicts that a 
'national health disaster' is imminent with the introduction of the TRIPs 
agreement.53 Under TRIPs it is inevitable that twenty-year patents will 
lead to either monopolistic or oligopolistic practices, with only a tiny 
coterie of firms controlling the supply and market prices of drugs. As a 
result, competition will be stymied and prices of medicines will 
inevitably increase. 
A critical examination of the retail prices of drugs in thirty-nine 
countries around the world by Williem Pretorius suggests that the guiding 
principle which the pharmaceutical industry adopts when fixing prices is 
'to charge what the market can bear' .54 In most countries of the South, this 
may result in companies adopting a high-price, low-volume strategy aimed 
only at those with the ability to pay (as was the case in India prior to the 
introduction of its 1970 Patents Act). Elsewhere, charging what the market 
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can bear entails a low-price, high-volume strategy aimed at the bulk of the 
population. The Delhi-based National Working Group on Patent Laws 
undertook a comparative study in 1993 which contrasted the price of drugs 
in India with countries that have patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The 
findings of the group showed that in several cases drug prices in India were 
forty-one times lower than those in countries that provided patent 
protection. Since TRIPs provisions relating to the patenting of 
pharmaceutical products and processes were implemented in India in 2005, 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are restricted from reverse engineering 
patented drugs until the twenty-year patents on such drugs expire. 
The pharmaceutical industry lobbied successfully for the uniform 
patent period of twenty years before and during the Uruguay Round. This 
duration is highly contentious. An optimal patent period should always 
reflect a balance between the rules of appropriation and the rules of 
diffusion by providing an incentive to innovate on the one hand and an 
opportunity to capture benefits on the other. One eminent economist 
describes the twenty-year patent duration as 'a period so long that few 
economists of repute can be found who would call it efficient in terms of 
balancing the two opposing forces [of appropriation and diffusion]'. 55 
Jayashree Watal, Counsellor in the Intellectual Property Division of 
the WTO, in a study undertaken in 2000, demonstrated how prices of 
generic medicines in India would rise by at least 26 per cent after the full 
implementation of TRIPs in 2005. In her study, Watal also verified that 
the price of patented drugs would r.ise by between 200 and 300 per cent 
from 2005 in lndia.56 An International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey on 
the possible consequences ofTRIPs highlighted that annual welfare losses 
to India could range from $US162 million to $US1.26 billion, while the 
annual profit transfer to foreign firms based in India would be between 
$US101 million and $US839 million.57 
The groundbreaking 1970 Indian Patents Act, which did not allow the 
patenting of pharmaceutical products, was emasculated in order to 
conform to TRIPs. Indian negotiators to the GATT, who viewed TRIPs 
as a process befitting the country's programme of economic liberalisation 
that was initiated in 1991, cannot be exonerated from blame. S. P. Shukla, 
Indian ambassador to the GATT from March 1984 to February 1989, 
characterised the Indian capitulation on TRIPs as 'The Geneva 
Surrender'. 58 India provides a salutary example of how even a powerful 
developing country can cede sovereignty over its laws governing property 
rights in pharmaceuticals. The multilateral framework embodied in the 
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WTO, while allowing for bargaining between members, has, on the issue 
of TRIPs, disproportionately favoured exporters of intellectual properry, 
with potentially calamitous consequences. 
TRIPs-related cases 
The TRIPs agreement is liable to have profound implications for national 
sovereignry, particularly in the area of health policy. While the Doha 
Declaration on Public Health of 200P9 allows for the issuing of a 
compulsory licence in the case of a national medical emergency or threat 
to public health, test cases illustrate that the issue is laden with complexiry 
and ambiguiry. The remaining options for WTO members to circumvent 
the stringencies of TRIPs include compulsory licensing and/or parallel 
importation. Although the option of compulsory licensing is permitted 
under TRIPs, only a few technologically advanced developing countries, 
such as India and Brazil, have the necessary facilities to undertake the 
production of generic pharmaceuticals. 
Countries without manufacturing facilities for pharmaceutical 
products can gain access to lower-priced drugs produced in other 
developing countries, or by generic manufacturers in some developed 
countries, by using parallel importation. This tactic allows a government 
to sanction the importation of pharmaceutical products when the price 
being charged by the patent holder in that jurisdiction is higher than the 
price being charged elsewhere.60 Balasubramaniam6' states that the analysis 
of empirical data 'supports the position that compulsory licensing and 
parallel imports are two regulatory tools that should be included in the 
national legislation of all developing countries'.62 The cases documented 
below highlight how the use of parallel imports and compulsory licensing, 
despite their legaliry under TRIPs, are still liable to opprobrium. 
The cases of South Africa, Brazil and the anthrax crisis of 2001 in the 
USA highlight how flexibilities within TRIPs can be utilised to implement 
public health policy in those respective countries, but also serve to 
illustrate that concessions in the arena of intellectual pro perry rights must 
be fought for assiduously. 
In November 1997, the government of South Africa amended its 
Medicines Act to allow it to undertake parallel importing and compulsory 
licensing in order to help it combat the country's burgeoning HIV/AIDS 
crisis. This would allow the South African government to purchase 
antiretroviral drugs from a third country instead of buying them from 
pharmaceutical firms within South Africa. Under TRIPs, this provision 
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applies only to patented drugs and not to generics. The South Mrican 
government's amendment was immediately subject to a lawsuit by thirty-
nine pharmaceutical firms on the grounds that it breached the obligations 
South Mrica had agreed to under TRIPs. In April 2001, the case was 
withdrawn in Pretoria by the pharmaceutical companies primarily on 
account of the bad publicity concerning the case that was generated by 
groupings such as Treatment Action Campaign, Medicins Sans Frontieres 
and Oxfam.63 The South Mrican case elucidated how, even when a 
country adheres to the provisions of TRIPs, it can still become subject to 
a legal challenge citing a breach ofWTO rules. This also proved to be the 
case with the Brazilian government. 
In March 2001, the Brazilian Health Ministry announced that it 
would issue compulsory licences to local producers in order to 
manufacture generic copies of two antiretroviral drugs used in the 
treatment ofHIV/AIDS unless Merck and Roche- the patent holders of 
both drugs - agreed to substantial price decreases. The cost of purchasing 
both drugs was absorbing half the Brazilian government's AIDS budget. 
Local producers estimated that they could produce both drugs at half the 
import price.64 International pharmaceutical companies had threatened to 
withdraw investment if the Brazilian government did not remove its threat 
to use compulsory licensing in order to alleviate the crisis.65 Under 
direction from PhRMA, the USA brought a WTO case against the 
Brazilian government. The suit challenged the latter's attempt to issue a 
compulsory licence in order to help counter a public health crisis. The case 
generated such negative publicity that Merck and Roche agreed to drop 
the prices of their patented antiretrovirals and the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) withdrew the complaint against Brazil. 
Nevertheless, the US government did not concede on the substance of the 
issue and stressed that it would deal with the issue bilaterally, while Brazil 
agreed to consult with the USTR over possible future use of its 
compulsory licensing laws. 
The South Mrican and Brazilian cases illustrate the pressures that 
countries can be subjected to even when their legislation is in compliance 
with TRIPs. As Brazil and South Mrica are advanced developing countries 
and, to a certain extent, regional powers, the cases against them generated 
levels of publicity that helped them overcome their respective TRIPs-
related crises. Countries lacking the financial resources and political 
influence of both Brazil and South Mrica may incur greater problems in 
resisting coercion. 
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The TRIPs agreement contains provisions in Article 31 which allow 
WTO members to use the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorisation of the rights holder in certain cases, such as a national 
emergency or 'other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use'. 66 The USA found itself facing such an emergency 
in October 2001 when anthrax spores dispatched by post killed a number 
of its citizens and threatened to cause a major health crisis among a public 
still convulsed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For USA trade officials, the 
anthrax crisis provoked a dilemma. With a WTO Ministerial Conference 
due to be held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, the USA did not wish 
to be perceived as malleable regarding patent rules. 
Nevertheless, the anthrax deaths provoked the US Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, to threaten Bayer AG, the 
producer and patent holder of the anti-anthrax antibiotic ciprofloxacin 
(Cipro), that if the corporation did not lower its price significantly he 
would disregard its patent and issue a compulsory licence to domestic 
manufacturersY Under a 1918 national security law, Thompson had the 
power to grant a compulsory licence to allow domestic manufacturers to 
produce generic Cipro to increase the government's dwindling back-up 
supply of the drug. In response to this threat, Bayer rescinded and 
dropped the price of Cipro that it had hitherto supplied to the US 
government by half. Bayer agreed to supply 300 million ciprofloxacin 
tablets to the US government at the drastically reduced price of 95 cents 
per tablet, a move which effectively averted the anthrax crisis. This gesture 
by Bayer served to undermine the US government's position on the 
sanctity of patents in the lead up to the crucial WTO Ministerial 
Conference which took place in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. 
The stance taken by the US on the anthrax crisis stressed not only the 
flexibilities of the TRIPs agreement, but how the US was willing to 
jettison its standpoint at international level on intellectual property to 
cope with a domestic crisis. 
The US government can be readily eulogised for acting in the public 
interest when its population was under threat from bio-terrorism. 
Nevertheless, when Brazil sought to ameliorate its devastating HIV/AIDS 
crisis utilising the same tactics - i.e. the use of a compulsory licence - it 
was excoriated by the USTR and threatened with a case against it at the 
WTO. In the run-up to the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference, and 
with the anthrax crisis ongoing, the USTR sought to block proposals that 
would clarify rules to allow developing countries to issue compulsory 
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licences during a public health crisis.68 The reach of the USTR's power is 
highly extensive, not only in developing countries. It was also seen to great 
effect in dealings with the Irish government throughout the late 1990s. 
Ireland and TRIPs 
The threat of taking a fellow member before the WTO's dispute 
settlement panel has proven to be a highly effective means of enforcing 
TRIPs. Despite the often supine stance taken by successive Irish 
governments in relation to United States' foreign policy, Ireland was the 
subject of a TRIPs-infringement case brought against it by President 
Clinton's United States Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, in 
1998. The case related to the Irish government's failure to enforce TRIPs 
provisions, which allowed the copyright of US software producers and 
filmmakers to be violated with virtual impunity. 
With trade sanctions a very realistic possibility, the Irish government 
committed itself in February 1998 to adopting a bill that would 
ameliorate the most apparent TRIPs deficiencies in Irish law by July 1998. 
As a consequence, the USTR decided to withdraw its case against Ireland. 
The case did highlight, however, that the US government is capable of 
enforcing its power by the threat of coercion and is symptomatic of how 
TRIPs can be used as an effective means of enforcing what John Ikenberry 
and Charles Kupchan have termed 'socialisation through external 
inducement' .69 It was somewhat ironic that Ireland was cited for copyright 
infringement in a global forum, as the first recorded instance of a 
judgement on copyright can be traced back to sixth-century Celtic 
Ireland, when An Breitheamh Diarmuid ruled that Saint Columba had 
infringed Brehon law by plagiarising the Latin Psalter of Saint Finian of 
Clonard. Diarmuid's decree that 'as to every cow its calf, so to every book 
its copy', set the precedent for copyright law worldwide/ " 
Present-day Ireland deposited its ratification of the WTO agreement, 
together with the annexes thereto, on 30 December 1994 and became an 
original member of the WTO on 1 January 1995, the date on which the 
TRIPs Agreement entered into force. Generally, ratification of a treaty or 
convention or agreement by a state constitutes the consent of that state 
to be bound by their respective provisions. While it had been deemed 
flagrant in its stance on software and video piracy, successive Irish 
governments have been loath to take any standpoint inimical to the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry in the area of intellectual property 
rights. This perspective is perhaps reflective of the fact that sixteen of the 
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top twenty pharmaceutical companies in the world have established 
facilities in Ireland and that the Irish pharmaceutical industry consists of 
120 companies, which employ more than 24,000 people/ 1 
As intellectual property rights are regarded as fundamental to the 
development and progress of the pharmaceutical industry, Ireland is 
considered a safe location for investment, not least due to its TRIPs-
compliant patent laws. Indeed, when TRIPs came into force in Ireland in 
January 1995, Irish patentlaw was already compatible with the agreement: 
Dail Eireann had passed the Irish Patents Act on 27 February 1992 and 
Ireland was a signatory to the European Patent Convention of 1973, both 
of which rigorously protect the intellectual property of innovators. 
Provision is made for compulsory licensing in the 1992 Act that allows a 
government minister to use 'Inventions for the Service of the State' .72 
The Irish government can issue a compulsory licence to a domestic 
manufacturer in the case of a national health emergency or 'for the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community' . However, Article 31(c) of TRIPs prevents the commercial 
use of a drug for which a compulsory licence has been issued and stipulates 
that products made under compulsory licensing must be 'predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such 
use' .73 This provision has profound implications for countries that do not 
have manufacturing capacity and need to import generic drugs, and for 
WTO members such as Brazil that export generics to other developing 
countries. Due to the opprobrium generated by Article 31 (f) of TRIPs, 
the WTO agreed to relax this provision in August 2003. Countries that 
are unable to manufacture medicines required in an emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency may now import generic copies made 
under compulsory licence subject to certain conditions. Consequently, 
any WTO Member may export generic medicines made under 
compulsory licences to meet the requirements of importing countries. 
While all WTO members may import generic medicines in extremis, 
twenty-three 'developed' countries within the WTO, including Ireland, 
voluntarily declared that they would not avail of this new, relaxed 
provision. Fifteen of the twenty-three countries are European Union (EU) 
members. The EU has consistently adopted the US stance on intellectual 
property, never better exemplified than when the European Commission 
recommended in September 2002 that it saw 'no reason' to amend the 
highly contentious Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs, despite the vociferous 
objections of many developing country representatives.74 
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Ireland's ability to influence EU policy in the area of intellectual 
property rights was further eroded with the passing of the second Nice 
Treaty referendum by the Irish electorate in October 2002. Article 133 of 
Nice transfers competence for the negotiation of issues pertaining to 
intellectual property to the European Commission. National ratification 
of intellectual property agreements is no longer required as the EU 
Council of Ministers will in future decide whether the EU enters a final 
agreement on the issue. Prior to Nice, voting on intellectual property 
agreements was subject to unanimity within the EU, which meant that a 
single EU Member State had the power to block any agreement. Since the 
ratification of Nice, the issue of intellectual property is decided by 
qualified majority voting/ 5 This aspect of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty 
severely limits the competence of national governments with regard to 
intellectual property negotiations and hands enormous powers to the EU 
Trade Commissioner in WTO negotiations. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the TRIPs agreement is that it has 
transformed intellectual property from an area of esoteric analysis by 
trade lawyers into an issue of pivotal importance in both the global 
knowledge economy and the developmental strategy of individual nation 
states. Nowhere is this highlighted more than in the issue of access to 
essential medicines. 
The pharmaceutical industry achieved a remarkable feat by creating 
new norms in a form of monopoly privileges (i.e. intellectual property) 
that were inserted into an organisation (the WTO) whose primary aim is 
the liberalisation of trade. A small coterie of knowledge-based companies 
was effectively able to enact public law for the rest of the world by linking 
transgressions of intellectual property rights around the globe with 
declining US competitiveness and inducing policy-makers and the office 
of the United States Trade Representative to accept this normative frame. 
Nevertheless, the victory of the pharmaceutical industry in bringing 
TRIPs within the WTO has since been undermined by the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis, which has provoked a backlash against the industry's 
stance on intellectual property rights. TRIPs does contain flexibilities such 
as compulsory licensing and parallel importation to help counter public 
health emergencies. However, attempts by two powerful developing 
countries, South Africa and Brazil, to avail of these provisions have been 
greeted with reproach by PhRMA. The continued use of unilateral 
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'Special 301' legislation by the United States to counteract piracy acts as 
a huge disincentive to countries to avail of TRIPs' flexibilities. 
The use of so-called 'TRIPs-plus' measures have also undermined the 
public health safeguards permitted to WTO members in TRIPs. Since the 
adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, the Clinton and Bush administrations 
have negotiated numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements that 
have imposed such 'TRIPs-plus' intellectual property rules on other WTO 
members. As a result, patented medicines have even higher levels of 
intellectual property protection than required in TRIPs, a tactic which has 
delayed the availability of affordable generic medicines. This trend is 
symptomatic of the Bush administration's tendency to use bilateral and 
regional agreements to enforce TRIPs rather than utilising the multilateral 
trade mechanisms in the WTO. For example, while the Clinton 
administration filed fifteen cases with the WTO from 1996 to 2000 
charging other WTO members with violations of US intellectual property, 
the Bush administration had filed only one intellectual-property-related 
case with the WTO between 2001 and September 2004.76 
The ability ofWTO member states to avail of the flexibilities within 
TRIPs will determine if the agreement is to achieve a balance whereby 
innovators can be rewarded without diminishing accessibility to essential 
medicines. If the TRIPs agreement fails to achieve this balance, and the 
WTO ignores the varying exigencies of its member states, the provisions 
within TRIPs pertaining to public health are likely to provoke even greater 
opprobrium and discord in the future. 
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